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What would the Babel fish say?
Commentary on Key on Fish Pain
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Abstract: Starting with its title, Key’s (2016) target article advocates the view that fish do not
feel pain. The author describes the neuroanatomical, physiological and behavioural
conditions involved in the experience of pain in humans and rodents and confidently applies
analogical arguments as though they were established facts in support of the negative
conclusion about the inability of fish to feel pain. The logical reasoning, unfortunately,
becomes somewhat incoherent, with the arbitrary application of the designated human
criteria for an analogical argument to one animal species (e.g., rodents) but not another
(fish). Research findings are reported selectively, and questionable interpretations are
invoked to support the author’s position. In this commentary, I briefly examine two of the
analogies presented in Key’s target article and highlight the role (and consequences) that
personal opinions and preconceptions have in issues concerning human ethical
responsibilities toward the welfare of non-human species.
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Introduction. The appeal of thinking by analogy rests in the fact that it allows us to explain
complicated ideas in an accessible way by creating mental pictures that relate the new and
unfamiliar to what we already know. However, the danger of argument by analogy is widely
recognised. Whether in politics, science or other areas of human thought, such arguments
are only as good as the premises that support them. In his target article, Key (2016) uses a
series of analogical arguments to tackle the contentious issue of whether fish feel pain,
confidently concluding that they do not. Like other authors before him (e.g., Rose, 2002;
Arlinghaus, Cooke, Schwab, & Cowx, 2007), Key argues that fish are not capable of feeling
pain (or, more generally, of suffering) because they lack the necessary neuroanatomy and
physiology underlying such feelings in humans. His line of reasoning is clearly self-consistent:
but are the original premises valid, and do they support his conclusion?
As pointed out by Cottee (2012) in her discussion of fear, pain and animal consciousness,
argument-by-analogy is a widely used method of comparing animal responses to specific
experiences with those of humans (and sometimes with those of the few ‘higher’ animal
species that are generally considered as having consciousness). When it comes to the
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specific question of fish and whether they have the capacity to experience mental states
such as pain and fear, this longstanding practice of analogical reasoning is used both by
those who do and those who do not believe fish can suffer. Though powerful, argument-byanalogy can become problematic (1) when it inappropriately considers human beings to be
the most important species in nature and hence uses human traits as the reference point
against which non-human experiences are measured (i.e. anthropocentrism), or (2) when it
attributes human-like behaviours, mental states and emotions to non-human others (i.e.
anthropomorphism). Anthropocentrism is generally considered valid and necessary (Murdy,
1975), though it sometimes arbitrarily favours organisms that are more like us (Andrews,
2015). Anthropomorphism is usually seen as a source of error to be avoided, yet one that
can sometimes help us better predict and explain those behaviours (Horowitz & Bekoff,
2007). In my view, what matters is whether the analogies we use provide a clearer
understanding and appreciation of nature or lead us down the road of biased arguments and
false beliefs.
Anthropocentric analogy. In humans, the cortex is the brain region responsible for pain
perception; hence, as the human yardstick for assessing pain, cortical activity may be a valid
indicator of the presence of pain in those animals (e.g., rodents) that have a cortex. It does
not follow from this, however, that the lack of a cortex is a valid indicator of the absence of
pain (e.g., Rose, 2002; Rose et al., 2014; and Key, 2016). This fallacy has been pointed out
time and time again (e.g., Chandroo, Yue & Moccia, 2004; Braithwaite & Boulcott, 2007;
Sneddon 2012; Cottee 2012; Segner 2012; Andrews 2015; Brown 2015). Invalid arguments
by analogy from structure (e.g., a particular neural network) to its necessity for function
(e.g., learning and memory) occur in various areas of biological research. The critical peer
commentary on Key’s target article accordingly provides a useful warning of the pitfalls of
this line of reasoning.
Anthropomorphic analogy. We can test whether animals react to what humans would
perceive as painful stimuli with behaviours similar to those generally exhibited by humans.
For example, since post-craniotomy pain in humans typically restricts physical movement
and reduces social function, similar effects in animals (e.g., craniotomy in rodents) would (as
suggested by Key) be indicative of pain. Experimental studies have indeed evaluated these
behavioural criteria following craniotomy in fish (Davis, Kassel & Schwagmeyer, 1976; Kassel,
Davis & Schwagmeyer, 1976; Schwagmeyer, Davis & Kassel, 1977; Davis, Reynolds & Ricks,
1978). The experimental evidence from these studies (although misreported by Key)
indicates that craniotomy in fish does affect normal physical movement such as swimming as
well as a range of socio-behavioural activities including courtship, building and tending nests,
and other reproductive behaviours. Hence if we apply Key’s analogy, then fish, like rodents
and humans, do feel pain. This conclusion then agrees with the compelling and extensive
published evidence of pain in fish that was oddly omitted from Key’s target article (e.g., as
reviewed by Braithwaite, 2010; Sneddon, 2011; Cottee, 2012; Segner, 2012; Brown, 2015;
and numerous others). Ironically given Key’s criticism of anthropomorphic tendencies, it is
his own anthropomorphic analogy (when applied correctly) that – unlike his anthropocentric
argument – seems to do the job of answering the question of whether fish feel pain.
Of Babel fish and red herrings. In Adams’s The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy, we are
introduced to a fictional alien fish that can cross the language barrier between species to
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perform instant translations (Adams, 1980). The Babel fish, as it is known, is probably the
only fish species ever able to use human language and report on ‘what it feels like’ for a fish
to be injured and in pain. However, do we really need a Babel fish to resolve the controversy
about pain and suffering in fish? Through careful experimental analysis, fish have been
allowed to display a number of physiological as well as behavioural responses to inform the
human observer of their cognitive and emotional states, including pain (see reviews by
Braithwaite, 2010; Sneddon, 2011; Cottee, 2012; Segner, 2012; Brown, 2015; and references
therein). The available experimental evidence is indeed quite clear on the issue. Therefore,
we need no more ‘red herrings’ to engage us in a discussion of personal beliefs and biased
interpretations of scientific evidence instead of addressing the real issue concerning the
welfare of the animal.
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